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The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the current system
for the disposal of Allowance Type (AT) Code 7 material from
submarine tenders, focusing specifically on material with an
extended cost less than $20. The current disposal system will be
analyzed and improvements recommended. Alternative disposal
systems will also be identified for possible consideration. Although
this thesis addresses only submeirine tenders that have relatively
large amounts of AT Code 7 material, the conclusions should be
applicable to low value excess material on other ships.
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The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the current system
for the disposal of Allowance Type (AT) Code 7 material from
submarine tenders, focusing specifically on material with an
extended cost less than $20. The disposal system will be analyzed
and improvemients recommended. Alternative disposal systems will
also be identified for possible consideration.
This thesis will be divided into three major sections:
• The first section will review the current system for disposal of
low cost excess material.
• The second section will develop a baseline cost for the current
system.
• The third section will recommend improvements to the current
system and possible alternatives that may lower costs.
In an era of shrinking budgets some possible alternative
methods for reducing the costs of disposal of low value excess
material should be investigated. Although this thesis addresses
only submarine tenders, which have relatively large numbers of AT
Code 7 material, the conclusions should be applicable to low value
excess material in other ships. When the possible savings are
multiplied across the entire Navy Supply System, they may be
significant.
B. BACKGROUND
As a result of monthly changes to shipboard Coordinated
Shipboard Allowance Lists (COSALs) and Tender Load Lists (TLLs)
many spare parts are moved from an allowed spares category to
an excess material category. Allowance type codes identify the
particular categories of spares carried aboard a ship with
Allowance Type Codes 6 and 7 being assigned to excess materisd.
On smedl combatants, all excess is labelled with an allowance type
code 6. On larger platforms carrying Navy Stock Fund material,
excess parts are divided Into two groups: those items with an
extended money value greater than $100 and those items with an
extended money Vcdue of less than or equal to $100. On such
platforms AT Code 6 is assigned to material greater than $100 and
AT Code 7 is assigned to material less than or equal to $100.
Submarine and destroyer tenders and aircraft carriers are
examples of ships that carry both ship's parts and Navy Stock
Fund parts. Such platforms are often referred to as Shipboard
Uniform Automated Data Processing System (SUADPS) 207 ships
in reference to the data processing system that controls their
logistic functions. A SUADPS 207 ship carries allowance type code
6 and allowance type code 7 material. The ships offload AT Code
6 material periodically (usually once a month) to reduce
unauthorized long supply figures.
AT Code 7 excess material and some AT Code 6 excess
material are left onboard a ship until an overhaul period or
Integrated logistics overhaul period occurs. At this point they are
offloaded and sent to the nearest stock point. AT Code 7 material
is not worth moving out of the storeroom to the supply center on
a periodic basis. However, this material does take space in
storerooms that could be used more productively. There is
significant expense involved in moving this material (whose
condition after being onboard ship for several years is suspect) and
trying to integrate it back into the Navy Supply System.
The primary issues that will be analyzed in this thesis are:
1. What are the major costs involved in how the system for
disposal of AT Code 7 material is organized?
2. Is the current system really cost effective?
3. If these items are not worth moving when stored on a ship,
is it cost effective to process them back into the supply
system?
4. Would it be cheaper to just dispose of parts at sea?
5. Are there alternatives to the current disposal process for AT
Code 7 material?
C. LIMITATIONS
There is very little written about the disposal of low dollar
value excess material. Most of the supply activities Investigated
did not keep records of many of the costs involved in the process.
Most of the cost information was obtained from estimates made by
the people Involved In the particular activity. Therefore, precise
estimation of the costs Involved was difficult and considerable
judgement was used In deriving the cost estimates.
The composition of the work force and labor wages vary from
one area to another. The research was accomplished primarily at
California naval activities that tend to have slightly higher costs
than the rest of the naval activities.
CHAPTER TWO: TRACING THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses the current system for turning in
allowance type code seven material. The discussion will trace
excess material from the time It leaves the ship to Its ultimate
destination. The rationale for this structure and the directives
that give the system its foundations will be examined. As such,
the chapter has four major sections:
• Disposal of AT Code 7 material at the shipboard level
• Disposal of At Code 7 material at the Integrated Logistics
Overhaul (ILO) site
• Disposal of AT Code 7 material at the Supply Center/Depot
level
• The low cost excess centers: ISSOT at NSC Oakland and NSC
Norfolk
B. SHIPBOARD LEVEL
As a result of chainges in demand and changes in equipment
configuration, all siiips carry repair parts onboard that are no
longer required. This material reduces storeroom space and ties
up assets that other platforms may require.
1. Excess Part Generation
There are basically three miethods by which excess
material is created onboard a vessel:
a. COSAL Maintenance
The Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) publishes a
revised Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) monthly for
every platform in the Navy. The COSAL is designed to reflect the
latest changes in repair part loading and any configuration
changes that occurred in the recent (and sometimes not so recent)
past. COSAL chcinges Increase, reduce or delete parts from a
ship's parts allowance list. When a COSAL change reduces or
deletes a stock numbered item fi^om a ship's allowance list, any
onboard stock in excess of the new allowance quantity for the part
moves to an excess category. The allowance type (AT) codes
identify a part as allowed ship stock (AT code 1 or 3) or excess
(AT code 6 or 7).
b. Load List Maintenance
Load list maintenance chcinges the amount of Navy
Stock Fund material onboard a SUADPS 207 ship. Load list
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maintenance is similar to COSAL maintenance. SPCC forwards a
monthly tape to reflect the latest changes in the tender load. As
with COSAL maintenance, the new load lists move parts to an
excess category (AT code 6 or 7) from an allowed category (AT code
2 or 3).
c. Miscellaneous
Other sources of excess material Include: incorrectly
ordered parts, excessive numbers of ordered parts, and material
turned into the supply officer from divisional "ready spaires"
lockers.
2. Excess Material Control
The Supply Management Afloat Guide, NAVSUP Pub-485
stresses the increasing importsince of "identification and purging of
excess stock...in the inventory cost function. "[Ref. 1] Most ships
spend very little time trying to accomplish this guidance. There is
not enough time nor resources to adequately screen and remove
the amiount of excess material that has accumulated over several
years.
The nature of a ship's supply parts determines how the
removal of excess is approached. There are basically two
categories of ships which vary according to the parts they carry,
end-use and Navy Stock Fund.
a. End-use
For end-use platforms, excess material generally
remains in the storerooms until the ship undergoes an overhaul.
During the overhaul process, a tesim composed of shipboard
members supervised by the Integrated Logistics Overhaul (ILO) site
will go aboard the ship and offload all repair parts to warehouses
on the pier. For the next several months the inventory will be
verified, counted, and returned to the ship. All the excess
material will be purged.
When a ship completes its overhaul, it should have a
refined COSAL with no excesses or deficiencies. In actual practice
this is not always the case. ILOs do not gilways accomplish their
objectives and not all ships will undergo this updating process.
Excess material may be carried for several more years untQ the
next overhaul or until the ship's supply officer directs it to be
offloaded (an unUkely occurrence).
b. Navy Stock Fund Ships
Navy Stock Fund (or SUADPS 207) ships constantly
offload excess material from their inventories. They submit
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monthly reports that outline how much excess they are carrying.
The fleet commander allows a certain percentage of excess material
per ship. This is approximately 5% of total inventory value for
both Pacific fleet and Atlantic fleet submarine tenders. [Ref. 2] To
stay within these goals, SUADPS 207 ships must continually
review their inventories and ofiload excess material.
Excess material on a SUADPS 207 ship falls into two
categories: AT code 6 and AT code 7 material. AT code 6
material has an extended money value greater than $100.00. AT
code 7 material has an extended money value of less than
$100.00. SUADPS 207 ships normally do not ofiload AT code 7
material since they are judged by the total dollar value of the
material unloaded and not by the number of line items. Therefore,
AT code 7 material typically remains in storerooms until the ship
goes through an overhaul period. Pacific fleet tenders usually go
through Incremental overhauls which do not allow enough time for
a full ILO cind ofiload of excess material.
AT code 7 material may begin to present a stowage
problem when it begins to accumulate after several years. This is
evident firom Table I. Table 1 contains a breakdown
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of AT Code 7 material from four different submarine tenders,
separated by number of line items and dollar amounts per line
items. Ships that have not undergone a recent ILO period tend to
have larger AT Code 7 inventories. For example, the USS
PROTEUS (AS- 19) has not undergone a frill overhaul since 1981.
The ship has more AT 7 parts than the other three tenders
combined.*
' Another contributing factor to the large amount of AT code
7 material is the wider range of parts that the PROTEUS must
carry to support the many different classes of submarines that the
ship must maintain.
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TABLE I: NUMBER OF LINE ITEMS AND DOLLAR VALUE OF AT 7 MATERIAL
ON FIVE SUBMARINE TENDERS






UNIT COST! LINES VALUE($) X LINES * VALUE
!
LINES VALUE($) * LINES * VALUE 1 LINES VALUE! $) * Llf.ES * VALUE 1
$0-5 ! 3650 38850 59.3^ 24.6*1 6341 11426 40.4* 3.9*1 3464 6869 39.3'i 4.9*1
$6-10
! 789 30067 12. 8t 19. n| 2510 16094 16.0* 5.5*1 1387 10096 15.7* 7.2*1
$11-25
!
903 39602 UJX 25. n| 2769 49537 17.6* 17.0*1 1904 31173 21.6* 22.1*1
$26-50 1 177 25191 7.8t 16.0*1 2158 77616 13.7* 26.7*1 1371 48251 15.!-; 34.2*1
$51-100
1 333 23949 5.4* 15.2*1
1
1929 135960 12.3* 46.8*1 691 44672 7.h\ 31.7*1
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UNIT COSTl LINES VALUE($) \ LINES * VALUE ! LINES VALUE($) * LINES * VALUE 1
$0-5 1 1570 2653 27. 2t 3.5*1 1345 14729 72.3* 40.6*1
$6-10
I
486 3501 8.4t 4.6*1 192 5462 10.3* 15.1*1
$11-25 1 750 12249 13. Ot 16.2*1 189 7613 10.2* 21.0*1
$26-50 ! 507 20453 8.8* 27.0*1 66 3518 3.5* 9.7*1
$51-100
1 2451 36895 42. 5» 48.7*1
1









ALL SHIPS AVERAGE »
LINES VALUE! $) »
$0-5 3274.0 14905.40 »
$6-10 1072.8 13044.00 <
$11-25 1303.0 28034.80 »
$26-50 915.8 35005.80 »
$51-100 1094.4 49278.60 «
tttttttuttttttntuttntuttt
TOTAL AVG 140268.6 *
ttutunntuttutttttiutttt
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C. INTEGRATED LOGISTICS OVERHAUL (ILO) SITES
The ILO period is the time for a ship to check whether the
repair parts it carries support the equipment that is installed
onboard. Material that has been ofiQoaded from a ship is screened
through a computer program that matches what is on hand with
what is required. The computer then generates excess lists and
shortage lists. The shortage quantities are requisitioned, and the
excess list is placed on computer tape and is forwarded to the
nearest supply center. The supply center will produce either a DD
Form 1348-1 or a similar bar-coded form to identiiy the quantity
and type of material. Members of the ILX) team will attach the
bar-coded documents to the material. They will then segregate the
material for shipment to the supply center. AT Code 7 excess
material is divided into two groups: those parts with greater than
$20.00 extended money value and those parts with less than
$20.00 extended money value. The two categories of material are
forwarded separately to the nearest supply center.
D. SUPPLY CENTERS
The supply center's responsibility is primarily as a staging and
redistribution point for the excess material that comes in. Excess
12
material flows into the Material Turned Into Stores (MTIS) section
of the supply center from various commands. MTIS personnel
may pull material to fill local requirements, forwgird material to
other supply activities or send the material to the Defense
Resources Management Organization (DRMO).
1. Less than $20.00 material
This category of material should already be segregated
upon arrival at the supply center. The supply center simply
forwards the material to the Improved Material Returns (IMR) sites
operated by the Integrated Supply Support Outfitting Teams
(ISSOT) at NSC Oakland or Portsmouth, VA. In accordance with
the Supply Management Afloat Guide, NAVSUP PUB-485, the Type
Commander (TYCOM) receives no credit for this material [Ref. 1,
para. 5066] Based on the amount of material turned into the
IMR sites in fiscal year 1989, it is essentially a $1,000,000 gift to
the Navy Supply System.
2. Greater than $20.00 material
The MTIS section of the supply center will screen this
excess materisd against their own requirements to determine
whether it should be retained on their shelves as Navy retail stock.
For large offloads of excess material, most supply centers require
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a prescreenlng before the material arrives. During the
prescreenlng, the supply center will check the material against
their shortages to determine If they have an outstanding
requirement for the material. If there is no requirement for the
excess miaterial, the supply center will query the appropriate
Integrated material manager (IMM) at the inventory control point
via the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS) for
disposition instructions." When the excess matches a requirement
elsewhere, the IMM sends forwarding Instructions. [Ref. 31
If no requirement exists for the material, the IMM is
supposed to issue distribution Instructions, either for temporary
retention in stock or disposition to DRMO. Anywhere from 15-
40% of the excess material may fit into this category. Much of
this material may wait two months or more for final resolution.
The MTIS department will eventually forward approximately 50%
of the material left in this indefinite category to the nearest
DRMO. [Ref. 4]
'
"The supply center will send an FTE query through DAAS to
the ICP. The IMM responds via an FTR in one of four ways:
^Take the material into back into the supply center and give credit
for it. ^ake the material back into the supply system and give no
credit. ^Have the material turned into DRMO.
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DODINST 4100.37 provides the framework for the
Department of Defense excess disposal policy. NAVSUPINST
4500.13 (still In the draft stage) outlines the latest retention and
disposal policy for the Navy. In its current configuration, the
instruction allows no disposal of stock items that have been In the
Navy Supply System seven years or less. This applies only to
repair parts and not to "consumable" items (pens, pencils, paper,
notebooks) like those provided by GSA. The supply system will
retain parts with an Item Mission Essentiality Code (IMEC) of 3,4
or 5 at a level of 20 years forecasted demand, plus all known
retail requirements and prepositloned war reserve
requirements. (Ref. 51*" [Ref. 6]
E. IMPROVED MATERIALS RETURNS (IMR) PROGRAM
Excess material with less than $20.00 extended money value
is processed back Into the supply system through the Improved
Material Returns (IMR) program. ISSOTs at NSC Oakland and at
IMECs are formed from the combination of Mission
Essentiality codes (MECs) and Mission Criticality Codes (MCCs).
MECs denote the Importance of a part to the applicable end item.
MCCs relate the criticality of the equipment or system to ship or
aircraft mission accomplishment. IMECs 3, 4, 5 indicate the
following: 3 - a severe degradation of primary mission capability;
4 - loss of primary mission capability; 5 - not mission capable,
not safely flyable (aviation only)lRef. 6, p. 2-40, 2-47]
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Portsmouth, VA run the IMR program. All navy activities send
their low value excess material to the two ISSOTs. Private
contractors provide the manpower for the ISSOTs. Navy personnel
supervise the overall operation.
ISSOTs screen, segregate, list and store material in much the
same manner as a supply center. They offer excess material back
to the supply system on a periodic basis through DAAS in the
same manner as the supply center. Each document is routed to
the appropriate inventory control point (ICP) and IMM by DAAS.
The IMM responds through DAAS with disposition Instructions
for the material. Returnable material is picked, packed, sind
shipped to the appropriate ICP/IMM/stock p>oint based on UMMIPS
priority and time frame criteria.
The material from the two ISSOT sites is distributed as per
Table II:
TABLE II: Material Distribution from ISSOT Sites
Portsmouth Oakland
NSC Norfolk 10% NSC Oakland 80%




Navy activities may request material from the ISSOT sites. ISSOT
may charge a picking and packing fee for processing the material
and for transportation costs. Otherwise the material is free.
During fiscal year 1988, the IMR program returned
approximately 193,000 line items to the supply system at a value
of $1.8 million. The cost to process this material was
approximately $ 1 million, excluding transportation and handling to
the processing site.[Ref. 7, p. 2]
Currentiy, ISSOT Oakland maintains an inventory of
approximately 700,000 items. [Ref. 8] ISSOT Portsmouth carries an
inventory of approximately 240,000 items. [Ref. 9] Since material
is not segregated by stock number, the actual number of line
items represented is lower. There are approximately four items for
every stock number. [Ref. 9] ISSOT tracks these items on a D-
Base III data base loaded on a Zenith 248 personal computer.
Figure 1 traces the flow of material from the ship to the
ISSOT site.
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FIGURE I: FLOW DIAGRAM OF MOVEMENT OF AT 7 MATERIAL
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CHAPTER THREE: COSTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter ansQyzes specific costs incurred by each part of
the system as material flows from the ship to the ISSOT sites at
Oakland and Portsmouth. Using the direct costing method, a cost
for each part of the system will be estimated and aggregated to
derive a totad cost. Direct costing suffers somewhat from an
accuracy standpoint in that the sum of the parts does not
necessarily equal the whole. Inaccuracies tend to compound
themselves throughout the estimation. Although direct costing
has certain disadvantages, it is difficult to analyze the problem any
other way. Additionally, assumptions concerning the flow of
material and number of personnel will be made to provide
consistency throughout the analysis.
This chapter will be divided into three sections:
• Baseline assumptions regarding the analysis
• Identifying the costs through the system
• Cost Drivers
A cost model will be derived to detennine the baseline costs
for material moving through the system fi-om the ship to the final
19
destination point. The primary factors involved in the cost
determination are transportation costs from one place to the next,
labor costs at each site, and holding costs at each site.
B. BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS
The baseline model is derived from a typical offload of material
from a submarine tender going through overhaul at Naval Shipyard
Long Beach. Based on Table I, which lists the number of AT code
7 items onboard five different tenders, the average amount of AT
Code 7 material offloaded would be approximately 7,600 line Items.
An estimated 5,000 of those line items will have extended money
values of less than $20.00.
The ship is assumed to offload all its storerooms into the ILO
warehouses at Long Beach and assign a certain number of sailors
to process the material. This is typically four lower grade petty
officers supervised by an E-6 from the ILO slte.[Ref. 10] The
excess material will follow Its normal route from Long Beach to
San Diego to Oakland.
Military pay rates are derived from the Billet Cost Model of the
Chief of Naval Operations. [Ref. 11] The current edition of the
model was published in 1984. The hourly rates in the model
20
were inflated by a Consumer Price Index multiplier to approximate
fiscal year 1989 wages.
A linear relationship is assumed between independent variables
and all costs. Equal increases In quantity will be reflected by
proportional increases in cost. A linear relationship is appropriate
for estimating the major portion of ISSOT costs since the civilian
contractors who work for the ISSOT are paid per a line item and
there is no discount for large volumes. Computing transportation
costs is where the linear assumptions tend to be questionable.
Transportation costs generally tend to decrease with an Increase in
volume. However, the transportation costs are the smallest part
of the total cost calculation, accounting for approximately one
percent of the total cost. Labor costs at ILO sites and at the
supply centers around the country are assumed to be
approximately the same.
C. IDENTIFYING THE COSTS
The cost categories are identified by three major headings,
corresponding to the areas where they were Incurred: the ILO
sites, the local supply centers and the ISSOTs at Portsmouth and
Oakland. Within each of these headings, costs were primarily
divided Into the following sections:
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• Labor costs by either sailors or civilian personnel at each of
the sites
• Shipping costs from each of the sites to the next location
• Holding costs for time spent at each location
Most of the costs of processing excess material are incurred
at the beginning and the end of the disposal process where the
majority of labor intensive work is performed. These costs are the
easiest to quantify. The in-transit shipping and handling costs are
a little more difficult to quantify which may result in some
inaccuracies.
1. Transfer Costs From The Ship To The Local Naval
Supply Center
The cost of transferring excess material from the ship to
the ILO site is not included as part of the cost estimate. During
an overhaul ah storeroom spares are offloaded, counted, verified
and placed In containers for eventual backloading onto the vessel.
Excess that was on the ship comes off with the rest of the
material.
During the verification process, stock numbers of all parts
from the ship are entered into an ILO computer which matches
the items in the warehouse against an updated COSAL or load list.
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A new requirements list and an offload list are generated as part
of this process. The oflQoad list Is kept on a computer tape. It is
at this point that the costs of processing the material back into
the system will start.
The computer tape is forwarded to NSC San Diego, the
closest supply center, for generation of turn-in documents. At the
Long Beach ILO the tape Is generally handcarrled to NSC San
Diego by a senior enlisted person, either an E-6 or an E-7.[Ref.
10] A senior person is sent to ensure the timely and safe arrival
of this Important tape. The cost of handcarrylng the tape to NSC
San Diego is one day's wages or one man day (eight hours). One
day's wages for an E-6 is $12.88/HR * 8 HRS = $103.04. The
distance between San Diego and Long Beach is approximately 120
miles. Assuming a government rate of $.24/mile, the
transportation costs are $57.60. [Ref. 12] Transportation gind wages
total $160.64. Dividing the cost by 7600 stock-numbered line
items generates a rate of $.021 cents per Itemi.
Sending a senior enlisted person with a computer tape to
the nearest supply center may be an anomaly of Long Beach. An
alternative approach would be to send the tape via Federal Express
or other rapid delivery organization. Federal Express advertises a
23
rate of $8.25 for their smallest package that a computer tape can
easily fit into. This would reduce the cost to $.001 per item.
Once the tape is at NSC San Diego, the ADP staff
produces picking tickets (tum-in documents) to be attached to the
material. The costs to produce a single picking ticket at the ADP
operation are approximately $0.06. [Ref. 13] Again an enlisted
person from the ship is sent to San Diego to pick up the picking
tickets. The 7600 picking tickets require several boxes and cannot
be forwarded via Federal Express cost effectively. Assuming an E-
6 is sent for the picking tickets, the same costs are incurred as
previously described so another $.021 is added to the line item
cost.
A group of four Junior petty ofi&cers/seamen attach the
picking tickets to the parts and load them for transportation to
NSC San Diego. For simplicity's sake, assume two E-3s and two
E-4s compose the group which is supervised full-time by an E-6.
Personnel at ILO Long Beach estimate that an individual can
process on the average 100 line items a day. Assuming that the
supervisor will also contribute toward the process, but at a lower
rate, (50% of the average assuming that approximately half his
time will be taken up with supervision and administration) a team
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of that size could process about 450 line items per day. Based on
the adjusted wage rates, the total cost to process the material is
displayed in Table III:
Table III: Labor Costs at ILO Site

















LINE ITEM COST: $332.16/450 - .74
NSC San Diego requires activities turning in excess parts
of less than $20 extended money value to load them into 20" x
20" X 20" boxes.(Ref. 14] Parts that are carried at NSC San Diego
are put into separate boxes from parts that are not carried at NSC
San Diego."" Approximately 250-300 line items can fit Into a
box.[Ref. 15] These boxes are sent daily to the transportation
department of the base a few blocks from the ILO site.
Transportation collects the boxes and sends them once a week to
San Diego. The cost of sending a truck to San Diego is
$220.00. [Ref 16] Sixteen 20" x 20" x 20" boxes can fit on a
Segregation of parts in this manner appears inefficient
when the c£irried and not carried boxes both go to the ISSOT at
Oakland. NSC San Diego requires the separation of the material
since the picking tickets were generated according to whether they
were carried or not carried at San Diego.
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pallet stacked four high. Sixteen pallets can fit on a large tractor-
trailer [Ref. 16]. Assuming an average of 275 line items per box,
then: 275 line items x 16 boxes x 16 pallets = 70.400 potential
line items could fit into a truck. The approximate average price of
transportation fi-om Long Beach to San Diego then is $.003 per
line item ($220/70,400). This is assimiing that the trucks are
utilized to their full capacity which is normally not going to be the
case.
One of the factors not considered up to this point is the
holding cost of the material at the ILO site. Material fi-om an
offload will remain at the ILO site anywhere fi-om 3-5 months. [Ref.
101 Excess material is generally the last material to be processed.
The minLmum amount of time in storage would therefore be three
months. The three month holding period and the standard 23%
annual holding cost for inventory in the Navy should be applied to
the value of the AT Code 7 inventory. [Ref. 6]
The AT Code 7 material can be valued in two ways:
extrinsically or intrinsically. The extrinsic value of the material is
its book value as described in the Management List, Navy (ML,N).
The averages In Table I were derived fi-om the extrinsic value of
the AT Code 7 material, yielding a value of approximately
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the AT Code 7 material, yielding a value of approximately
$140,000. The intrinsic value of the material can be defined as
what the material is actually worth to the Navy. The $140,000
"book" value does not consider how much of the material will
eventually be scrapped. For an accurate measurement of
processing costs, the intrinsic value of the material should be used
instead on its "book" value. Since 75% of the less than $20.00
material is passed to DRMO, the intrinsic value of the material is
actually below $140,000.[Ref. 17][Ref. 18)
Figure II is a graphic illustration of the intrinsic valuation
of the parts in the system as outlined in this paragraph. The
average ML,N value of the AT Code 7 material with extended cost
less than $20.00 is approximately $50,000. Twenty-five percent of
this material goes back into the supply system ($13,500). The
remainder ($37,500) is transferred to DRMO. At DRMO
approximately 14% of the material is reutilized by the services for
a value of $5,250.[Ref. 19] The rest ($32,250) is sold or scrapped
at a rate of 2.8% of the original cost of the material for a value of
$903. [Ref. 20] Therefore, the total intrinsic value of the material
is $109,653 as outlined in the Table IV:
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FIGURE II: FLOW OF FUNDS
EXTENDED
MONEY VALUE
























TABLE IV: SUMMARY OF MATERIAL VALUE
CATEGORY OF MATERIAL COST
>$20 MATERIAL $ 90,000
<$20 MATERIAL GOING TO IMM DIR $ 13,500
14% OF MAT'L REUTILIZED FM DRMO $ 5,250
SALE AND SCRAP BALANCE $ 903
TOTAL $109,653
For purposes of consistency In the analysis, the $109,653
value will be used. When $109,653 is multiplied by the 23%
holding cost for three months, the result is $6,305.03 On a per
line item basis, the holding cost works out to $.83 ($6,305/7600).
The total amount to process one AT Code 7 part in this
stage of the process is summarized in Table V.




Trans . to San Diego .003
Holding Costs .830
Total Cost Per Line 1.673
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2. Costs From Local Supply Center to NSC Oakland:
The supply centers act solely as a staging area for the
majority of low cost excess material. At NSC San Diego all
material less than $20.00 per line item is offloaded from the Long
Beach truck and staged for further transportation to the ISSOT
site at NSC Oakland. This would account for about 5,000 out of
the original 7,600 AT code 7 items ofQoaded at Long Beach.
Material greater than $20.00 per line item is segregated by whether
it is carried or not carried at NSC San Diego. Approximately 35-
40% of the excess material greater than $20.00 per line item falls
into this category and is taken into stock. The turnaround time
for material not taken into stock is approximately 30-60
days.[Ref. 21]
There are three costs associated with material at this
point: handling, holding, and transportation. The less than
$20.00 material requires only minimal handling since it is merely
moved from the Long Beach truck and staged until enough
material is gathered to fill a truck for transshipment to Oakland.
The MTIS supervisor estimated that this process Involved only five
people for four hours of work with total volume of approximately
eight pallets once a month. [Ref. 21] Assuming that the five
30
people are Logistics Technicians and receiving WG-4 pay, their
hourly wages are $10.96.[Ref. 11] Total cost for processing the 8
pallets is:
5 people X 4 hrs x 10.96 = $219.13
If 8 pallets represent approximately 35,200 line items (8 pallets x
16 boxes X 275 parts/box) then the cost per line item is
approximately $.006 ($219.13/35200).
The remainder of the AT code 7 offload represents about
2,600 line items. Forty percent of that material (1040 line items)
will stay at NSC San Diego. The cost of processing a receipt is
$3.49 at NSC San Diego. [Ref. 22] The receipt cost multipUed by
1040 gives a total of $3,630.
The remaining 60% of the AT code 7 material greater than
$20.00 extended money value (1560 items) will have a holding
period of approximately 30 days awaiting disposition instructions
from the IMM. Roughly Ccilculating from Table I, the average value
for all material greater than $20.00 per line item is $90,000.
Dividing $90,000 by the initial 2,600 line items with extended
money values greater than $20.00 will yield an average line item
value of $34.62 ($90,000/2600). Multiplying the 1560 line items
not taken into NSC San Diego's stock times the $34.62 unit price
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gives an approximate inventory value of $54,000. All of the less
than $20.00 material would have a value of approximately
$19,653. Therefore, the total value of material awaiting transit
would be $73,653 ($54,000 + $19,653). Applying the 23% per
year holding cost for one month would yield a value of $1,412.
To find a unit cost for all parts processed by NSC San
Diego, a weighted average of the processing cost of the material
kept at the NSC which is greater than $20 ($3,630) and the
processing cost of the material not kept at NSC ($1,412) must be
taken. Averaging the total cost of $5,042 over 7,600 parts yields
a per item cost of $.663 ($5042/7600).
Shipping costs from NSC San Diego to NSC Oakland are
based on weight. The lowest cost is for a triwall container
weighing from 50-100 pounds ($26.00). [Ref. 23] Since most AT
code 7 material is small in size, and based on similar volumes of
the containers, the amount of material fitting into a triwall would
be approximately the same as the amount fitting on a pallet (16
(20x20x201 boxes x 275 parts = 4400 line items), the lowest cost
triwall would probably be appropriate. The 5000 less-than-$20.00
parts would use 2 triwalls at $26.00/triwall for a total of $52.00
or $.006 per line item. The greater-than-$20.00 material is
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shipped to many different places and estimating the shipping costs
is impossible.
In summary, the total costs at the supply center for
moving and processing the hypothetical AT code 7 offload is:
Table VI: Summary of NSC costs
for processing all AT code 7 mat'l
Handling-Mat' 1<$20 .006




Total Cost Per Line .675
3. Costs at the ISSOT Sites:
Costs at the ISSOT sites are relatively simple to quantify.
The Navy pays the contractor a per line item charge for processing
material. These charges are broken down as follows:
Table VII: IMR Program Costs
Portsmouth Oakland




Overhead-26% Ports/11.7% Oak .343 .267
Total line item cost 1.663 2.547
[Ref. 7]
Based on the year-end monthly status reports for both
Portsmouth and Oakland, the administrative overhead rates for
each are 26% and 11.7% respectively. (Ref. 24] [Ref. 25] Applying
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the applicable overhead rates to the Oakland and the Portsmouth
ISSOTs would yield a total of $2.55 for Oakland and $1.66 for
Portsmouth per Item.
Not accounted for In the overhead calculations are the
holding costs for the material and the opportunity cost of ISSOT
use of government facilities. The standard Navy 23% holding cost
rate includes a warehousing cost (1%), so the opportunity cost of
using the facility can be excluded. The holding cost at each of the
facilities can be calculated by taking £in average of the processing
time and multiplying it by the Navy's holding cost rate. The
average holding time at Portsmouth is 45 days or 1.5 months. [Ref.
7J Oakland's holding time is 105 days or 3.5 months.lRef. 26]
Given the inventory value of $19,653 for the less-than-$20 material
calculated on page 29, the holding cost is approximately $.0753
per month per item ($19,653/5000 * .23/12). This translates into
a holding cost of $.113/item (1.5 mos. x $.0753/month) for
Portsmouth and $.264/item (3.5 mos. x $.08/month) for Oakland.
The above costs represent the minimum holding costs.
ISSOT Oakland has a very substantial inventory (700,000 items)
which is growing. [Ref
. 26] Since the ISSOTs are not supposed to
be mini-supply centers, the majority of the material in inventory
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can be considered backlog. Assuming the processing rate at the
IMR site is the same as the ILO site since the type of material and
difficulty levels of processing are similar, it would take 32 months
to reduce the Oakland Inventory level down to zero (ten people
working continuously). It would take at least 27 months to reduce
the current level at the Oakland IMR site to approximately 100,000
items. A 27 month holding cost per line item would raise the
total holding cost to $2.16 per line item.
To fully complete the cost determination of the present
system, the cost of shipping from the ISSOT sites to the final
destinations would also have to be added in. An estimation of the
transportation costs would be very difficult since the ffiial
destinations vary considerably. On the west coast, 80% of the
parts go eventually to NSC Oakland. [Ref. 7] Transportation costs
to move the material from the ISSOT warehouses to the NSC
Oakland warehouses would be minimal. On the east coast, only
10% of the material goes to NSC Norfolk and 80% goes to the
Defense Logistics Agency (DL^.[Ref. 9]
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In summaiy the total IMR Program Costs are:
Table VIII: Total IMR Costs
Portsmouth Oakland
Contract Costs 1.663 2.547
Holding Costs .113 .264
Total line item cost 1.776 2.810
Table IX summarizes the costs from the different stages
the material must pass through. The total aggregate cost for the
east coast is $4.12/item and for the west coast is $5. 15/item.
D. COST DRIVERS
There are several cost drivers that must be accounted for In
calculating the costs of running the system as it is currently
configured. The most obvious cost driver in this example is the
location of the ofQoadlng activity. While the Long Beach ILO is
one of the largest ILO sites on the west coast, it is not the only
one. There are sites at San Diego, Mare Island and Bremerton
and several on the east coast. ILO sites near Norfolk and Oakland
send their material directly to the ISSOTs, avoiding the added cost
of shipping through the local supply center. [Ref. 27] Doing this
would result in a savings of approximately $.74 per line item.
36
TABLE IX: TOTAL COST BASELINE
PORTS { OAKLAND VARIABLES
ILO COSTS MOUTH
TRANS « LINES H TRIPS
.=======
[TRANSPORTATION 0.042 { 0.042 160.64 7600 2
1 ADP 0.060 { 0.060
E-3 LBR E-4 LBR E-6 LBR IIPTS/DAY
{LABOR 0.738 { 0.738 100.48 120.64 103.04 4 50
TRUCK ttLINF « BOXES/ 11 PALLETS
,
COST PER BOX PALLET I'lIR TRUCK
! SHIPPING 0.003 { 0.003 220 275 16 16
COST OF HOLDING
INV COST < PARTS 11 MONTHS
JHOLDING 0.830 { 0.830 109653 0.230 7600 3
1 TOTAL 1 .673 { 1.673
I
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = ==:rrr:=:rr=:=: = = = = = =; — =: = = =;=: = = = =: ="================ rr.r, = = = =: = = rT
jNSC COSTS
« PERS HOURS UAGE
i HANDLING 0.006 ! 0.006 5 4.000 10.96
KMAT'L <$20)
VAL>120 VAL<1.20 HOLD COS 1 tt PRTS
[HOLDING 0.215 { 0.215 54000 19653 0.23 6560
1(MAT 'L <$20 8c
1 >$20 NOT RECVD BY S.D.
)
{SUBTOTAL 0.221 { 0.221
IREC. COSTS 3.490 { 3.490 MTIS COST »PTS>f20






1 TOTAL UEIGHTED AVG 0.669 { 0.669
lOF <$20 & >?t20
SHIP COSTtt LIfJrS/PAL
{SHIPPING 0.006 { 0.006 26.00 4400
{TOTAL 0.675 { 0.675
[ ISSOT COSTS PORTS [OAKLAND PORTS OAK PORTS-OH OAK-OH
{CONTRACT COSTS 1 .666 { 2.547 1 .32 2.28 0.26 0.117
DYS tILD DYS HLD HLD COST iN\/ VALUE
{HOLDING 0.113 { 0.264 ! 45 105 0.23 19653
{TOTAL 1 .779 { 2.810 !
= = = = = = = = =: = •••*~~~~~~ —
{GRAND TOTAL 4 .121 { 5.152 !
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ILO sites are not the only sources of low cost excess material.
Shipyards, Naval Supply Centers and other shore establishments
also provide material to the ISSOTs. Such shore establishments
employ civilians to handle most of the supply functions. Civilians
are generally paid more than their military counterparts. Their
handling of the same kinds of tasks as the sailors perform at the
ILO sites would undoubtedly raise the costs of the work performed.
The ILO labor costs are a minimum figure which is more likely to
move up than down.
The largest single component in the total cost calculation is
the Une item cost outlined in the ISSOT contracts. These costs
represent approximately 50% of the total for the west coast and
about 41% of the total for the east coast. These are also the most
concrete costs available in the entire analysis, since they are
contractually stipulated.
There are major price variances between the two ISSOT sites.
It is approximately $1.03 per item cheaper to process material on
the east coast than on the west coast. Depending upon the
transportation costs, more material should be processed by the
Portsmouth site than by the Oakland site.
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1. Sensitivity Analysis
A sensltlvlly analysis was conducted to examine changes
in the following variables:
• Number of iLne Items
• Holding costs - value of the Inventory
• Holding time
Table X summarizes the effect of changes In the values of these
variables.*
The largest uncertainties occur with the number of line Items
moved and the cost of those line Items. Number of parts and cost
are the primary factors in calculating transportation costs per unit
and holding cost per unit.
a. Number of Line Items
The number of line Items offloaded during a ship's
visit to an ILO site is derived somewlial simply l)y averaging the
AT Code 7 Items from the sample of five submarine tenders. This
number, If anything, errs on the conservative side. The larger the
number of parts, the lower the cost per line item when an Item is
being transported. Tables XI and XII represent approximately one
For individual spreadsheets see Appendix A
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TABLE X: A COMPARISON OF THE BASELINE AGAINST VARYING INPUTS
BASELINE COSTS CHANGE I OF PARTS CHANGE I PARTS
FH 7600 TO 5600 FH 7600 TO 9600
CHANGES PARTS PER
BOX FH 275 TO 400
COMBINED CHANGES: 9601
TOTAL PARTS & 400/BOX
PORTS 1 OAKLAND II PORTS I OAKLAND || PORTS | OAKLAND |! PORTS I OAKLAND || PORTS
ILO COSTS 1 1! 1 I! 1 II 1 II
1 TRANSPORTATION 0.042 1 0.042 || 0.057 | 0.057 1 1 0.033 1 0.033 |! 0.042 1 0.042 |1 0.042





1 Mill II II
I ADP 0.060 I 0.060 !| 0.060 | 0.060 |1 0.060 | 0.060 |! 0.060 1 0.060 |1 0.060





1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
ILABOR 0.738 | 0.738 || 0.738 I 0.738 || 0.738 | 0.738 || 0.738 | 0.738 |! 0.738
1 ...... . . 11 . 1 . II •' '1
0.738
1
ISHIPPING 0.003 1 0.003 || 0.003 | 0.003 |! 0.003 1. 0.003 || 0.002 I 0.002 |! 0.002
1 II 1 II II II
0.002 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
1 II .1 . .11 II ..II
,
0.657 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
ITOTAL 1.673 | 1.673 \\ 1.985 | 1.985 |! 1.492 | 1.492 |! 1.672 I 1.672 H 1.499
|Zzzzrzz:zzzzzzzzzzzzzz:zzzzzzzzzzzzzZ| |ZzzzzzzzZ|ZzzzzzzzZ| |Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz=zzZ| |:zzz:zz=zrzzzrzzzz:| |Zzzzzz::z
INSC COSTS 1 II 1 II 1 II 1 II
IHANDLING 0.006 | 0.006 |! 0.006 | 0.006 || 0.006 | 0.006 |1 0.006 I 0.006 || 0.006
KHAT'L ($20) 1 II 1 II 1 II 1 !!





[HOLDING 0.215 | 0.215 \\ 0.295 | 0.295 || 0.170 | 0.170 !| 0.215 I 0.215 1| 0.170
Khat'l ($20 i ! 1! ! 1! I !l ! !l
|>$20 not recvd by s.d.) 1 II 1 1! 1 II I i!
1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
0.170
1
[subtotal 0.221 1 0.221 |I 0.301 I 0.301 |! 0.177 | 0.177 || 0.221 | 0.221 || 0.177
1.. - . . . II 1 II II II
0.177 I
1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
IREC. COSTS 3.490 1 3.490 || 3.490 | 3.490 || 3.490 | 3.490 || 3.490 I 3.490 || 3.490
|()$20 KEPT AT NSC)
I || | |I I || I i|
1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
3.490 1
1 II 1 1 1 II 1
1"
ITOTAL WEIGHTED AVG 0.669 | 0.669 |I 0.741 | 0.741 || 0.630 | 0.630 |I 0.669 ] 0.669 1| 0.630
lOF ($20 J )$20
I II 1 II 1 11 1 II
1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 II II
0.630 1
ISHIPPING 0.006 1 0.006 || 0.006 | 0.006 || 0.006 | 0.006 I| 0.006 I 0.006 || 0.006
1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
0.006
!
1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
ITOTAL 0.675
I









IISSOT 1 II 1 II 1 II 1 II
ICONTRACT COSTS 1.666 | 2.547 || 1.666 | 2.547 i| 1.666 | 2.547 !| 1.666 | 2.547 || 1.666





1 M 1 II II II
IHOLDING 0.113 | 0.264 |! 0.113 | 0.264 || 0.113 | 0.264 || 0.113 [ 0.264 || 0.113
1 1 1 1 1 1 II II
0.264
1
1 ^^ ^ ^^. ^^
^^
—
ITOTAL 1.779 1 2.810 || 1.779 I 2.810 II 1.779 | 2.810 |I 1.779 I 2.810 || 1.779
'::rzrzzzzzzzzzzi = z = :z = zrrzzz-z--r '• ' '' ''-- ''
1 1 II 1 II 1 II 1 II
1 1 II 1 II 1 II 1 II
1 1 II 1 II 1 II 1 II 1
1 1 II 1 II 1 II 1 II 1
IGRAND TOTAL 4.121] 5.152 || 4.504 I 5.536 |I 3.900 | 4.932 || 4.120 | 5.151 |! 3.908
1









zzzzZjZ.zzzzzzZi |Zzzzzz:z:..rzzr:z.:| ,-- = :-zzz.-z
^ ^
1
ICHANGE FROM THE BASELINE I| 1.09 | 1.07 || 0.95 | 0.96 || 1.00 | 1.00 I| 0.95
'








TABLE XI: SAMPLE OF TURN-INS TO MTIS DEPARTMENT
AT NSC SAN DIEGO
TOTAL % OF
ACTIVITY EXCESS < $20.00 < $20.00
USS ELLIOT 8790 4995 56 .8%
USS GEORGE PHILLIPS 2768 1436 51 .9%
NAVTRAIN SYSCOM 4079 2932 71 .9%
USS THACH 8201 5405 65 .9%
USS NEW ORLEANS 704 20 2 .8%
USS LONG BEACH 1964 911 46 .4%
USS HENRY B. WILSON 5672 4077 71 .9%
USS ALAMO 1684 1209 71 .8%
USS HORNE 18150 11156 61 .5%
SIMA SAN DIEGO 1753 710 40 .5%
USS TUSCALOOSA 4688 3442 73 .4%
NAVSTA S.D. 2197 43 2 .0%
USS LONG BEACH 11861 7215 60 .8%
TOTAL 72511 43551 60 .\%
TABLE XII:
ACTIVITY
SAMPLE OF TURN-INS TO ILO ORGANIZATION
AT LONG BEACH NAVAL SHIPYARD
TOTAL % OF
EXCESS < $20.00 < $20.00
USS OGDEN 2331 6
1
.3%
USS CROMELLIN 10988 7 501
1
68 .3%
USS TARAWA 21008 6503
1
31 .0%
USS FLETCHER 5672 4077
1
71 .9%
USS LEWIS B. PULLER 1684 1209
1
71 .8%
USS JOUETT 18088 11313
:
62 .5%
USS JOHN A. MOORE 1670 74
1
4 .4%
USS GEORGE PHILIP 4787 2835
!
59 .2%







year's worth of material tum-in data from the ILO site at Long
Beach and the MTIS department at NSC San Diego. The average
at the ILO site for all material Is 7,863, including material of over
$100 extended money value. The average at NSC San Diego is
5,578, also including the material over $100. Actual amounts of
AT Code 7 material would probably be less than the 7,600 line
items assumed in the analysis.
VirtuatQy all unit costs at the ILO site and the supply
center are dependent on the number of parts. Table X shows that
lowering the number of line items from 7,600 to 5,600 (26.3%),
results in an increase of approximately 8% in cost ($.38). Table
X also indicates that an increase in the number of lines items
from 7,600 to 9,600 (26.3%) results in a smaller decrease In cost;
approximately 4.5% ($.22). Figure III, which graphs the change in
number of parts versus change In unit cost, confirms that the cost
is more sensitive to a decrease in the number of parts than to an
increase in the number of parts.
Closely related to the number of total line items are
the shipping costs. Shipping costs are primarily affected by the
number of units that fit into a container. The ILO site ships low
dollar excess in boxes that are 20" x 20" x 20". The number of
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FIGURE III: CHANGE IN UNIT COST VERSUS
CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF PARTS




8600 9600 10600 11600
COST - OAKLAND
NUMBER OF PORTS OAKLAND
PARTS COST COST
2600 6.16 7.19
3600 5.30 6 .33
4600 4 .82 5.85
5600 4 .50 5.54
6600 4 .29 5.32
7600 4 .13 5.16
8600 4 .00 5.04
9600 3.91 4 .94
10600 3.83 4 .86
11600 3.76 4 .79
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£irts that can fit in such a container is variable. Since AT code
7 material tends to be small, ILO personnel estimated that
approximately 250-300 line items could fit into such a box. For
the cost estimate, an average of 275 was used. Based on the
capacity of a truck to hold 16 pallets of 16 boxes of 275 parts, a
price of $.003 was derived. Increasing the number of parts to 400
per box had virtually no effect on the result. Since the simount
per line item is already less than $.01, the number of line items
per box has little effect on the total cost. This is also
demonstrated In Table X.
Shipment costs fi-om NSC San Diego are also based on
number of Une items per triwsdl. 4,400 hne items were estimated
to fit into a triwall and that figure was divided into the cost of
shipping one triwall to Oakland (at the cheapest rate). The
resultant amount of $.006 will be little affected by an Increase In
the number of line items per triwall.
Changes in the number of fine items have a marginal
effect on the unit cost of transporting the ADP tape back and forth
fi-om the ILO site to the supply center. A 2,000 part increase or
decrease lowers and raises the cost by less than $.02.
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b. Holding Costs
Holding cost is perhaps the most contentious Item In
the analysis since It accounts for the largest fraction of the total
cost after the ISSOT contract costs. Holding costs are based on
the value of the Inventory. The value of the inventory was
estimated by averaging the data from the five submarine tenders
and subtracting out the excess that was not reutillzed by the
supply system to arrive at an estimated intrinsic value. As seen
from Table I there is a wide variance in the value of AT code 7
inventory among the five tenders. This variance would be even
more pronounced between different ship types.
Figure IV presents a graph of changes in inventory
value versus changes in unit cost in $10,000 Increments. The
curve indicates a constant change in unit cost. A $20,000 (18%)
change on either side of the estimated $109,653 value yields a
$.21 (5%) change in unit cost in either direction.
c. Holding Time
A related variable to holding cost is holding time.
Holding cost is a function of holding time. By varying the holding
time at the various locations which are responsible for processing
At Code 7 material, holding costs will increase or decrease. The
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FIGURE IV: CHANGE IN UNIT COST VERSUS
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4 COST - OAKLAND
INVENTORY PORTS OAKLAND
VALUE COST COST




129653 4 .332 5.391
139653 4.435 5 .508
149653 4 .538 5.625
159653 4 .641 5 .741
169653 4.744 5.858
179653 4.874 5 .975
189653 4 .950 6.091
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total affect of holding time changes is diluted through the holding
cost percentage (23%). A change of 33% in the amount of time
required to process a part yields only a small percentage change
in the unit cost, approximately two to four percent. Figure V is
a graphic examiple of the change in unit cost versus the change in
holding time at the IIX) site. Appendix B further illustrates the
change in cost versus the change in holding time at the various
activities processing AT Code 7 material.
d. Labor Costs
Labor costs at the beginning gmd the end of the turn-
in process comprise most of the expenses involved in moving AT
code 7 material. These costs however, are the easiest to quantify
and are a function of the number of manhours used. The labor at
the ILO site is determined by the wages of the sailors involved in
the offloading and segregating of material. While the mix of sailors
may vary somewhat between paygrades, it is unlikely that the unit
cost will increase or decrease with any significance. The labor
costs at the ISSOT sites are fixed by contract and the unit cost
will not vary at all.
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FIGURE V: CHANGE IN UNIT COST VERSUS




COST - PORTSMOUTH COST - OAKLAND
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e, ConcXvL^ons
The holding cost portion of the total cost is the most
sensitive to changes of the variables examined with the greatest
uncertainty. However, it is only marginally more sensitive than a
change in the number of line items, by perhaps a percentage point
or two. The efifect of holding cost on the total cost of the disposal
system underscores the importance of an accurate valuation of the
cost of the excess material. An accurate valuation was determined
in this thesis through an intrinsic derivation of the value of the
excess material. Additionally, the accuracy of the line item count
plays a significant role in the cost estimation. While a simple
average was used In this thesis, a leirger sampling of SUADPS 207
ships would allow a more precise estimation. Holding time shows
little sensitivity.
The contract labor costs at the ISSOT are the largest
cost drivers in the analysis accounting for 32% of the cost at
Portsmouth and 44% of the cost at Oakland. These are the areas
where the greatest cost savings can occur. Any reductions In the
use of contract labor costs will lower total system cost. Close
attention to future contract costs will be required to minimize
increases in this area.
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXPLORING THE ALTERNATIVES
This chapter will analyze the cost effectiveness of the current
system and Introduce some possible cost-saving alternatives.
Although the Navy Is not a profit-oriented organization, Navy
poUcles In regard to Inventory management should be backed by
sohd, economic, rational behavior. Programs should be able to
"pay" for themselves or at least be self-sufficient through whatever
criteria are used to measure payment.
A. THE STATUS QUO
The Improved Material Returns (IMR) prograun is an example
of a program that pays for Itself. In fiscal year 1989 the IMR
program returned approximately $1.8 million worth of parts to the
supply system. The processing cost for that material was about
$1.0 million, providing a "profit" of $800,000. [Ref. 7] Such a 44%
return on revenues would be the envy of most, if not all, the
companies of the Stsindard and Poor's 500 whose return on equity
is generally much lower. And regulated Industries in the U.S.
averaged only a 10-14% return on equity over the last 20
years. [Ref. 28]
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The "profit" above is calculated by totaling all of the credits
received from the item inventory managers (through FTR - TA
responses received which give credit for turned in material) and
subtracting out the costs incurred by the ISSOT sites. For fiscal
year 1989. Oakland's credits totalled $147,005.34. However,
Oakland periodically ships material to end-users such as shipyards
and other activities requiring parts that may not be available from
normal channels or that can be procured less expensively through
Oakland. [Ref. 17] While NAVSUP receives no financial credit for
this material, it represents savings to the Navy in the form of cost
avoidance for the type commander or final customer. These
amounts should be included In the total credit calculation.
Oakland does not keep track of the costs of the material it
sends to other commands. [Ref. 29] Yet, in terms of the number
of bne items, the amount sent to end-users exceeds the amount
turned into the IMM for credit (24,015 versus 20,202). [Ref. 24] To
make a rough estimate of how much this material is worth, the
number of parts turned over to end-users can be multiplied by the
average price of material Oakland turned back into the system.
This yields a value of $174,829.20 (147,005.34/20,202 x
24,0 15). [Ref. 17] Therefore, a rough estimate of Oakland's total
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"revenues" Is $321,834.54 while their costs for the year are
$350,082.36 giving them a loss of $28,247.82 for the year.lRef. 24]
Since this figure Is based on rough estimates, It Is subject to some
variability.
Portsmouth Is finishing fiscal year 1989 with a $177,779.52
"profit" on costs of $333,271.IRef. 25] Portsmouth supplies a
much lower volume of parts to end-users (636) than Oakland
which costs Portsmouth $10 each to process according to their
estimates. (Ref. 30 J In order to be consistent, the same unit price
will be applied to Portsmouth as to Oakland ($7.28 - average price
of material Oakland turned back into the system) which will
provide an additional $4,630.08 of revenue to Portsmiouth.
Total combined costs for the two ISSOT sites In fiscal year
1989 are $683,353.36. Their estimated combined "revenues' are
$837,515.14 yielding a "profit" of $154,161.78 and a return on
revenues of 18.4%. Although clearly not as high as fiscal year
1988's return, this eimount represents a significant "profit" on
investment for the supply system.
Such glowing reports are positive indications for the IMR
program. However, the IMR figures do not include transportation
costs to and from the IMR sites. [Ref. 7] Since the costs of the
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system do not begin and end at the IMR sites, It is appropriate to
include both the transportation and handling costs to and from
the IMR sites.
In chapter two a unit cost per item was developed to aid in
estimating the true total system cost. For AT Code 7 items that
are less than $20 extended money value, this cost is $4.12 or
$5. 15 depending on which ISSOT is handling the material. Taking
the actuad cost data from Portsmouth and Oakland as a baseline,
the additional costs required to get the material to the sites can
be quantified relatively easily. Using the number of items stowed
at the IMR sites as their amount of inflow, the cost to get the
material to the IMR sites are the ILO and supply center costs
times the number of stows at the IMR sites. Beised on the
estimates in chapter three, this amounts to $2.35 per item. Total
system costs (not Including cost of sending material out from the
ISSOTs) are presented laid out in Table XIII:
TABLE XIII: SYSTEM COSTS FOR FY 89
IMR SITES rY89 Costs Items Stowed
in FY89
Total
PORTSMOUTH $333,271.00 176,373 X $2.35 $ 747,747.55
OAKLAND $350,082.36 195,920 X $2.35 $ 810,494.36
Total Costs $1,558,241.90
Total Revenues $ 832,885.06
Profit (Loss) ($725,356.84)
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As seen in Table XIII when the costs of getting material to the
IMR sites are added to the costs actually Incxirred at the sites, the
system lost money in fiscal year 1989. Furthermore, this
calculation does not include the cost of sending material out fi*om
the IMR sites.
The costs to transport material fi*om the ship to the IMR site
($2.35) in table XIII are derived in chapter three and are open to
the same criticisms. Different ILO sites, supply centers, and
number of line items will all have an efiect on the unit cost.
However, the seime observations in chapter three hold true in
chapter four also. There is a higher probability of the unit cost
rising than falling since the costs in chapter three are based on
the complete and efiicient use of all resources. The unit costs
represent a conservative estimate of the total system unit costs.
In summary, at first glance, the IMR concept appears to pay
for itself in its current configuration. The return on the funds
Invested seems high. However, the IMR program does not factor
in costs associated with getting material to the site and the costs
associated with shipping the material to the next customer. When
just the cost of moving material to the site is taken Into account,
the program does not pay for itself but actually costs more to
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operate from a system-wide perspective than the revenues it
generates.
B. IMPROVmG THE STATUS QUO
Given the conclusion above, should the IMR program be
eliminated? Not necessarily. The IMR program can be improved
to become more cost effective. Like any profit making organization,
the IMR program must accomplish one (or both) of two actions:
Reduce costs throughout the system (most of which it can't
control) and/or increase "revenues" (revenues being the amount of
credit for NAVSUP the program generates or the cost avoidances
by supplying material to TYCOMs or other users). The next two
sections will Introduce how this can be achieved.
1. Reducing Costs
The supply system is a large production process. However,
unlike most production processes, the supply system does not take
raw material and Improve its value through different production
stages. Any time an item is moved, stored, issued, and scrapped,
investment costs are added to the parts in terms of manhours,
transportation costs and material costs. By Improving the flow of
material through the system, cost reductions can be accomplished.
55
Improvement of material flow to eliminate wasteful
practices can also be applied to the process for putting low dollar
value excess back Into the system. According to FOSSAC, the
IMM forwards 68% of the Items coming Into the ISSOT sites to
disposal at DRMO.[Ref. 31] At the Portsmouth ISSOT site, the
cumulative IMR Credit Report for August showed a rate of 82%
disposal to DRMO.[Ref. 321 The rate increased in September to
83%. The combined rate for both ISSOTs is 75%.[Ref. 171lRef. 18]
Sending parts to disposal at this point is the same as performing
a quality inspection at the end of a production process. Parts are
going through the elaborate turn-in system, having Investment
costs added at each step in the process, and then end up being
disposed of at the nearest DRMO at the end of the process.
Rationally, it would make more sense to query the IMM at the
beginning of the process and segregate out the material that is
destined for disposal. Material for which valid requirements still
exist could be forwarded on to the ISSOT site. Other material
would go directly to the nearest DRMO. This would have two
beneficial effects:
1. Investment costs would be saved on all the material that
is not forwarded to an ISSOT site and would reduce system
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costs by 43% or $673,490. This is calculated by taking 75%
of the receipts (stows) at the IMR sites (that would now go
directly to DRMO) and multiplying that figure by the unit
savings throughout the system. The resulting transportation
and handling savings are fairly small while most of the ILO
site costs will still be incurred. Small amounts of savings
would be received at the supply center. However, the largest
savings would be accrued from the reduction In IMR
processing costs. The savings are outlined In the table below:
Table XIV: Savings from turning material directly into DRMO from the
ILO Site
AREA OF SAVINGS PORTSMOUTH OAKLAND
SHIPPING COSTS FM SUPPLY CENTER .01 .01
HOLDING COST AT SUPPLY CENTER .08 .08
PROCESSING COSTS AT THE I^4R SITES 1.78 2.81
TOTAL UNIT SAVINGS 1.87 2,90
75% OF ITEMS STOWED 132,280 146, 940
TOTAL UNIT SAVINGS X ITEMS STOWED $247,364 $426,126
TOTAL SAVINGS $673,490
2. The requirements for personnel at the ISSOT site itself
would be reduced.
The ILO sites gire already cataloging excess material onto a
computer tape. Instead of sending the tape to the nearest supply
center, the ILO could query the IMM directly for disposition
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instructions on the less than $20 extended money value material
and forward the undesired excess directly to the nearest DRMO.
Any material without immediate disposition instructions and all
the useful excess could then be forwarded directly to the ISSOT
site. The ILO site would probably require some additional
capability to query the item managers via DAAS, but the
investment would be fairly small. Segregation of material for
shipment to the DRMO would also require minimal additional
manpower. Naval Supply Centers turning in low value excess
already have the capacity to query the IMM and could perform the
same functions as outlined in the preceding paragraph.
Another possible improvement to the process in
combination with the above suggestions would be to load material
into containers that would go directly onto the shelf at the IMR
site without any additional handling. The ISSOT could standardize
all the containers that material would be loaded into. All ILO sites
and supply centers would put low dollar excess material in the
standard container, record the contents through bar-coding and
then assign a bar-code identification number to the box. The
contents of all bar-coded boxes could be loaded onto a floppy disk
which could be downloaded to the computers at the ISSOT site.
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The only handling at the ISSOT site would be to put the box in a
location and record the location. Although hard to quantify
exactly, a significant labor savings should accrue from material not
having to be pulled and identified at the ISSOT site.
2. Increasing "Revenues"
There are two ways to raise revenue: increase the number
of credits received from the IMM and expand the number of parts
issued to other activities.
Increasing the number of credits from the item manager
is very unlikely. Item manager requirements are driven by system
needs. Even if the ISSOT offered discounts or more favorable
trade arrangements, the item managers would not take much more
of their material. However, more queries for credit could be
processed to raise the amount of credit responses. Oakland, in
particular, has a low rate of querying the IMM, accounting for 44%
of the number of items stowed in fiscal year 1989 and only 22%
of the amount that the Portsmouth ISSOT sends out queries
for(85,600 versus 383,400). [Ref 25][Ref. 18] Portsmouth made
2.17 times more queries than the number of parts it stowed in
fiscal year 1989. Part of Oakland's low query rate is due to the
late v^dnter arrival of software that significantly enhanced their
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ability to generate IMM queries. [Ref. 33] However, Oakland still
appears to be lagging in the number of queries made to the IMM
and should be increasing its query output to generate more credits.
Providing more parts to other activities seems to offer the
most promise as an area of "revenue" expansion. ISSOT Oakland
seems to be taking the lead in providing customers with parts that
help them to avoid costs of new procurement. Of 26,711 inquiries
for parts that ISSOT Ocikland received in the last fiscal year, it
was able to satisfy 24,015 or approximately 90% of the
requirements. [Ref. 24]
This is a significant statistic. It indicates that there is
perhaps a completely different direction that the IMR program
should focus on; i.e. marketing itself as a provider of virtually
cost-fi-ee parts to all ships going through overhauls and as a
provider of last resort for operational units with critical materiad
shortages.
Providing parts to the fleet does not come without cost.
ISSOT still must pay its contractors to pick, pack and ship the
parts. Overhead rates are especially affected by the extra
administrative burdens of dealing with fleet requirements for follow-
up messages on priority items. ISSOT Portsmouth estimated that
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to process its 636 customer requirements, It incurred a cost of
$2,805, mostly in additional overhead. [Ref. 30] The parts
Portsmouth filled were primcirily for work-stoppage priority items
not available elsewhere in the supply system. The $4.41 per line
item cost to retrieve and ship a priority part however, seems a
fairly reasonable price.
If customers were requesting parts on a lower priority
basis on a floppy disc compatible with the ADP equipment at the
ISSOT sites, the extra overhead cost per unit to process the
material would be negligible. Since ISSOTs were established as
fully reimbursable programs, the costs associated with pulling emd
shipping the parts could be passed on to the customer. [Ref. 34]
This is already being accomplished at Oakland but at a very low
level. The program needs to advertise how the fleet can acquire
these assets for virtually nothing.
Enhancing the cost avoidance feature of the program has
a few drawbacks from a supply perspective. NAVSUP will receive
less credits for material that is passed back into the system. More
parts would be going directly back to the same kind of customer
from whence they came in the first place. The type commanders
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and other end users will be happy because they are avoiding costs,
but NAVSUP may not be happy because it is losing funding.
The other drawback is that demand for the parts wouldn't
be recorded in the supply system. Lack of recorded demand could
affect stockage levels for parts. However, a mechanism could be
eventually developed to record demand for parts issued to
customers in this way.
C. OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO THE IMR PROGRAM
The next four subsections will develop alternatives to the IMR
program for disposing and processing of low dollar excess.
1. Alternative I: Disposing of Low Dollar Excess at Sea
At first glance, the most economical method of disposing
low dollar value excess may be to just let the sailors throw the
material over board. However, two considerations must be made
prior to implementing this imminently practical method of low cost
excess parts disposal:
• The price level at which to throw parts away versus turning
them In.
• External issues such as the environment and political
ramifications.
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a. Determining the Price Level
AT Code 7 material encompasses a wide range of parts
with most of the items costing less than $20 (See Table I). From
a purely economic standpoint, any part that's value is less than
the cost to process it back into the system should be thrown away.
It makes little sense to spend $5 to place a $.05 part back into
the supply system.
The unit cost for processing material back into the
supply system was calculated in chapter III. Depending on which
coast a ship is on, it could cost either $4.12 or $5.15. DLA
calculates that every item turned into disposal costs $5.31 per
unit to process. [Ref. 35] Additionally, throwing a part over the
side means that the item does not need to be carried ashore.
Depending on the vessel, carrying parts ashore may be a very
labor intensive exercise. Assuming that a similar mix of labor and
manhours is required onboard the ship as at the ILO site to move
the material ashore, then another $.74 would be added to the cost
of moving material from the ship to shore (See table IX).
Therefore, any parts less than the combined costs ($5.31 + $.74 +
$4.12 or $5.15) should not be considered for tum-ln, but rather
disposed of into the nearest dumpster. Referring back to the
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offload quantities in chapter II, table I, there are approximately
4000 parts costing less than $10.
4000 X ($4.12 + $.74 + $5.31) = $40,680
4000 X ($5.15 + $.74 + $5.31) = $44,800
The above amounts would need to be adjusted for the value of the
25% of the material that would have been reutillzed by DoD (from
Table I. the value of material less than or equal to $10 is $27,950
X .25 = $6988) minus the 14% of the remaining material that
would have been used by other federal services ($27,950 - $6,988
= $20,962 X .14 = $2,935). The cost savings of disposal at sea
for an average submarine tender would be $30,757 ($40,680 -
$9,923) or $34,877 ($44,800 - $9,923), depending on which coast
it is operating on.
Throwing material away whose value is less than its
processing cost can be justified In another manner. In fiscal year
1989, 75% of all material handled through the Improved Material
Returns (IMR) program went to DRMO.[Ref. 35] From a narrow
parochial perspective, since the U.S. Treasury receives the proceeds
from DRMO and not the Navy, it is essentially "throwing away" the
parts. [Ref. 36] The 25% of the material left over doesn't generate
large amounts of credit for the Navy either. Some of that material
includes parts that are turned into the item manager without
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credit. In fiscal year 1989, only 11.2% of all the less than $20
extended money value material turned into the system actually
produced credits. [Ref. 171[Ref. 18]
b. Externalities
Issues such as the deliberate disposal of perfectly good
government material at sea cannot be considered In a vacuum.
The Navy would not be meeting the spirit of the Defense Utilization
and Disposal Manual to
"promote maximum utilization of supply systems stocks,
excess, surplus and foreign excess personal property and
refined precious metals.. "[Ref. 37]
Environmentally and politically, throwing away good parts may be
hard to justify.
AT code 7 material tends to be small items, generally
rubber o-rtngs, fuses and other like material, all of which are very
non-biodegradable. Recently, in ain effort to show its
environmental sensitivities, the Navy banned the dumping of
plastics at sea. [Ref. 38] Rubber would fall into a similar category.
Additionally, there aire numerous hazardous materials that fall into
the AT Code 7 category, fi-om smgdl containers of solvents to
asbestos seals. Therefore, shore disposal would be superior to at
sea disposal. If the supply ofRcer has to take the materiail off the
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ship, then he is incurring the same relative costs as taking the
material to the ILO site, thus nullifying the additional $.74 saved
by disposal at sea.
The political consequences may be much more extreme
than the environmental ones. In an era of declining budgets, it
would be political suicide to be perceived as 'Vasttng" government
resources. The symbolic significance of such "waste" would more
than overshadow the economic rationale for such actions. The
appeairance of waste would be loudly exploited by opportunists
with another agenda for dollars spent on national defense.
In summary, although disposal at sea probably makes
lots of economic sense, it would most Likely be politically
infeasible and environmentally Irresponsible.
2. Alternative 11: Turning All Low Dollar Excess into
DRMO
A variant of the disposal at sea strategy for the lowest cost
excess (which has been identified as material below the $10.00
range) is to turn all such material into DRMO, the "official DoD
dumpster site." There material can be sold on the outside market
or transferred to other governmental agencies.
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This strategy has a certain amount of promise to it.
Approximately 75% of the less-than-$20 parts end up going to
DRMO anyway. By going directly to the DRMO from the ILO site,
all of the intermediate processing steps would be eliminated.
However, the savings from sending the material directly to DRMO
must be balanced out against the cost of replacing the 25% of the
less-than-$20 material that would have gone back into the system.
Assuming that the ILO costs would still be incurred regsirdless of
whether Alternative 11 or the status quo were chosen, $2.45 or
$3.48 per unit would be saved ($4.12 or $5.15 minus $1.67 ILO
site costs). There is a trainsportation charge to move materiail to
the nearest DRMO. Based on figiires from NSC Charleston, the
cost to move one unit of material was $.05. Subtract $.05 from
the unit cost above to calculate the potential unit cost avoidance
($2.40 or $3.43). Multiplying the number of items received in
fiscal year 1989 at each of the two IMR sites times the unit cost
saved would generate the gross cost avoidsince. Subtracting out
the replacement cost of the 25% material that would have gone
into the system will give the total net savings. These costs are
outlined in the Table IV:
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TABLE XV: Direct to DRMO Savings PORTS OAKLAND
Cost avoidance going directly to DRMO $2.40 $3.43
Number of parts received <$20 176,373 195,920
Gross cost avoidance $423,295 $672,006
25% of parts received 44,093 48,980
Average cost of mat'l <$20 $7.28 $7.28
Replacement cost $320,999 $356,574
Total Net Savings $102,296 $315,432
The average cost of material less-than-$20 was computed using the
same unit cost derived at the beginning of the chapter, $7.28.
New procurement would add additional administrative costs on top
of the replacement cost of the material in Table XV, possibly
reducing the savings to a significant degree.
A possible offshoot of this strategy would be to send
material to DRMO that Is not classified a repair part. Some of the
material that winds up at the ISSOT site Is consumable material
such as wrenches, pens, pencils and other low cost Items that aid
In the dafiy operation of ships and offices. Parts could be
segregated by cognizance code and only those Items that are
specifically designated as repair parts would be forwarded on to
the IMR sites. By eliminating many of these peripheral parts, the
ISSOT could concentrate on moving the more Importemt material
back Into the supply system.
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This alternative could be used in combination with other
strategies discussed in this chapter. In any case Alternative 11
avoids the political liability of throwing away parts, and the
associated environmental problems.
3. Alternative IH: Establishing An Excess "Servmart"
The large number of requests for parts from other
commands that ISSOT Oakland was able to fill indicates that
much of the material that goes through the IMR program is still
used in the fleet. Unfortunately, the fleet sailor who knows
his/her requirements does not have much access to the material
in Oakland and Portsmouth. This situation could be rectified by
establishing a form of "excess Servmart" where the material could
be handled much like it is at Oakland and Portsmouth, only the
sites would be spread out among the naval bases with the largest
concentrations of ships. Ships would be allowed to send
representatives into this servmart to search for required materials.
The same data base currently in effect at the ISSOT sites could be
maintained agaiinst which queries fi^om outside organizations could
be processed. The potential payoff for the Navy is in the form of
cost avoidances to the customer.
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Although the data is somewhat scarce. If the experience of
Oakland is any Indication, the amount of cost avoidance would
eclipse the amount of credit the Navy Supply System would accrue.
According to Mr. Ken Whitney, a former Navy chief who now works
for CACI at their San Diego field ofBce, when the excess lists for
one of the platforms he worked on were thoroughly analyzed, about
30% of the "excess" parts were ultimately still required onboard the
same ship.[Ref. 39] The parts had become excess through stock
number migration or imperfect COSAL maintenance.
The type commanders have already established some
precedent for "excess Servmarts" in their "mini-supply systems"
which they operate for high value excess apart from the supply
system. Perceiving that they were not being treated fairly in the
tum-in program, TYCOMs on both coasts have set up their own
stocks of high value excess parts. SUBPAC, SUBLANT, SURFPAC,
SURFLANT all have some variation of these programs, which they
justify by the amount of cost avoidances they generate. However,
TYCOMs have avoided the low end of the excess spectrum.
Two costs would be primarily associated with this
alternative: the transportation cost to the servmart site and the
operating cost for the servmart itself. Transportation costs would
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be minimal for the majority of platforms since an excess servmart
would be located at all the major naval installations. Operating
costs would be significant. The operating cost for a major
Servmart, such as the 32nd Street Naval Station Servmart in San
Diego, is approximately $212,900 per year, not including the cost
of the facility. [Ref. 40] An estimated seven excess servmarts could
be operated for the same costs estimated in Table XIII for the
status quo.
However, there are severed major problems associated with this
approach. The excess servmarts would need to return greater than
30% of thetr incoming excess parts back to the fleet to equal the
revenues or cost avoidances of the current IMR program.
Additionally, the availability of facilities is questionable, given the
current crowded conditions at most naval bases and supply
centers. If there were at least three such servmarts on the west
coast and they split the approximately 195,000 parts that the
Oakland ISSOT received last year, each would be managing some
65,000 parts each year or approximately 16,000 line items (4:1
ratio of parts to line items). The 32nd Street Servmart handles
only 2,954 Une items. The large amount of unknowns require
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further analysis and study prior to its adoption as an alternative.
4. Alternative IV: Commercial Operation of the Excess
Material System
An alternative to continuing Navy involvement in the
excess business would be to allow a private contractor to handle
low cost excess from "cradle to grave". The contractor could come
aboard a Navy vessel, take the parts off the ship, catalogue the
parts, and offer parts the Navy requires back to the Navy at a
price which includes some sort of reasonable profit. The parts
which have httle usefulness to the Navy could be sold by the
contractor on the open market.
Although the exact form of the program may be difficult to
define, there are severad savings that could resiilt. Most of the
costs of taking excess off the ship and routing it through the
current network would be saved. There would still be some
administrative costs because ship's personnel would be Involved in
opening up storerooms and guarding against contractor theft of
parts, etc. The entire IMR program would be eliminated and there
would be reductions of workload at ILO sites across the country.
If there is contractor enough interest in the program, contractors
72
could bid against one another to ofQoad low cost excess from
ships.
Contractor interest in the idea, however, has not been
overwhelming. Inquiries made with six contractors currently
engaged or interested in Navy logistics work, yielded no positive
responses. SEACOR, the previous holder of the ISSOT contracts,
felt that there was too much risk Involved In such an
arrangement. [Ref. 41] Investment in infrastructure would be
excessive with little opportunity to recover costs. Additionally,
SEACOR felt that the market for excess parts would be very
limited.
What is more appealing to contractors is an extension
of the current ISSOT contract where the contractor would handle
all of the excess disposal on a Time and Materials contract basis.
The Navy would pay the contractor to take the material off the
ship and put it into location at a Navy facility. The contractor
would push material back to the system the same way the IMR
program currently works. The Navy would recoup its investment
in the contract through the amount of credits received from the
IMM. The Navy would completely stay out of the excess business
and let the contractor handle all facets of materlcd processing,
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including the ultimate disposal of material going to DRMO. The
savings from this alternative would be threefold:
• The ship would not have to move any parts off Its shelves.
This Is a savings of approximately $.74 per item applying the
same labor rates on the ships as at the ILO site (See Table
DQ.
• ILO site and NSC costs would be avoided for a total of $2.35
per imlt (See Table IX costs for ILO and NSC).
• The IMR overhead costs of $104,800 for the last fiscal year
would be saved. Averaging the overhead over the number of
parts received during last fiscal year yields a unit cost of
$.28.[Ref. 241(Ref. 25]
The total savings per unit part would be $3.37.
The unit savings would have to be compared against the
Increased unit cost of the ISSOT contract. Although no contractor
is willing to give detailed cost figures at this point, rough estimates
of $3.00 per binned item and $5.00 per bulk item were provided
to move material from a ship to a storage location. IRef. 41] The
vast majority of AT Code 7 items are small and fit Into a bin.
Therefore, most of the material would fall Into the $3.00 range.
The savings would then be $.37 per part. Multiplied by the
372,293 parts received at both ISSOTs during the last fiscal year
would provide a total savings of $137,748. However, due to the
lack of concrete cost data fi-om the potential contractors, the total
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savings are small and subject to error. Even if the cost of
complete commercial operation of the low cost excess material
equalled the status quo, the Navy would be out of the low cost
spares business and could apply its human resources in other
areas of need.
5. Comparison of Alternatives
Several siltematives to the IMR program have been
introduced in this section. Clearly, some of the alternatives are
superior to others. Direct transfer of parts to DRMO has the most
quantifiable cost savings and could be implmented with little
problem. Establishment of excess servmarts would be difficult to
implement and there are several uncertain variables in the costs.
Commercial operation of the low cost excess material system
appears to save few costs in relation to the present system.
Disposal of parts at sea has environmental and political drawbacks
and is probably the least desirable of the alternatives.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Low cost excess material presents the same kinds of problems
encountered with more valuable parts; namely, what to do with the
material once it is no longer needed. Although the total dollars
and amounts involved in the procurement and distribution of
allowance type code seven parts are relatively small when viewed
against the enormity of the money invested in the more expensive
Navy inventory, this is still an area where increased efficiency can
produce quantifiable savings.
As a result of the analysis in this thesis, several conclusions
were derived concerning the low cost excess disposal system and
the IMR program. The primary conclusion is that although the
IMR program appears to pay for itself, from a system-wide
perspective, it does not. Two costs drivers were identified in the
low cost disposal system: the contract costs at the ISSOT and the
holding costs of the material enroute to the ISSOTs. Any efforts
to streamline the contract costs at the ISSOT site will result in the
most significant savings. Holding costs are a fiinction of holding
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time and the applied holding percentage. The only significant area
where the system can improve holding costs is by reducing holding
time at each of the stages that material passes through.
When the source of low cost excess material is close to the
ISSOT, the process is already streamlined by the direct movement
of parts to the ISSOTs without additional handling at the local
supply center and additional transportation charges. Distance is
critical, especially considering the large variance In the costs
between the two ISSOTs. Depending on the transportation costs,
more material should be processed at Portsmouth than Oakland to
take advantage of the 37% difference in contract costs.
Inefficiencies were uncovered which can be modified to improve
the cost-effectiveness of the system. The current system has three
primary shortcomings:
First: The current system for less-than-$20 excess parts falls
to check material for tum-in to the Defense Reutilization
Management Office (DRMO) until it has passed through the
entire network resulting in additional Investment in pairts that
are not going to be reutilized by the Navy.
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Second: There is a lack of consistency in the amount of
queries to the item material managers between the two
Improved Material Return (IMR) sites. This appears to have
resulted in a large and growing inventory at the Oakland
ISSOT site. The costs of managing such an inventory are
large, and NAVSUP is not receiving any benefit from material
sitting in storage.
Third: There is little fleet visibility of the assets which are
contained in the IMR program, therefore limiting the potential
for reutillzatlon of the material.
As a result of the deficiencies above, five alternatives were
introduced with the following conclusions:
ALTERNATIVE 1. Modifying the existing system:
Modifying the current system offers the most tangible benefits.
Three modifications can increase cost-effectiveness:
• Segregate material destined for DRMO at the ILO site or at the
local supply center.
• Establish a uniform policy for querying the item manager
about item disposition.
• Provide the fleet with information about the Inventory.
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• streamline the entire process by loading material into
containers that can be put directly onto the shelf at the ISSOT
site.
The modifications above have the following advantages:
• The IMR program can be made more cost-effective with minor
changes to the procedures in effect.
• Material sent directly to DRMO will incur lower system
processing costs.
• Segregating out material destined for DRMO at the ILO site
can be accomplished relatively easily and with only a small
additional investment in equipment.
• A uniform policy for querying the item manager would
standardize querying rates and raise potential credits for
NAVSUP while shrinking the inventories and the size of the
IMR sites on both coasts.
• Providing on-line ADP access to the fleet would broaden the
customer base for ISSOT material and improve the cost
avoidance feature of the program.
• Establishing a system whereby the material from the ILO sites
can go directly on the shelf at the ISSOT without further
handling will lower labor requirements and should result in a
reduced contract cost.
The primary disadvantage to this approach is that increasing the
number of parts sent directly to DRMO may reduce the
opportunity for fleet reutilization of some of the assets. However,
the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages and make this the
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most viable of the options. All of these modifications would
Increase the system effectiveness and reduce costs.
ALTERNATIVE 2. Send all material directly to DRMO rather
than the IMR site:
There are several readily apparent advantages to sending material
directly to DRMO:
• All the costs of getting the material to the IMR site w^ould be
eliminated
• Most of the material v^ould go directly to its ultimate
destination
• All the costs associated with running the IMR program would
be eliminated
• It would probably be the easiest of the alternatives to
implement
The drawbacks to directing all the less-than-$20 material to DRMO
are:
• There would be no parts available for fleet reutiUzation
• The 25% of the material that would have gone back Into the
system would now have to be procured
The savings from going directly to DRMO are quantifiable.
However, the additional cost of purchasing the approximately 25%
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of material that would have gone back Into the system is a large
unknown. This cost could be substantial, nullifying much of the
savings from the elimination of extra processing costs and the IMR
Infrastructure
.
ALTERNATIVE 3. Establish mini-senrmarts to redistribute less-
than-$20 material ezcessed from ships:
The advantages of creating an excess "servmart' are several:
• Larger amounts of low cost excess would be utilized by the
fleet and the type comjiiEinders would incur greater cost
avoidances.
• Processing costs would be reduced since material would be
staying in the saime area as where it was offloaded.
• Costs of maintaining the IMR program would be eliminated.
There are also several disadveintages to this alternative:
• The availability of warehouse space at supply centers is
already at a premium and additional space for this alternative
may not be readily attainable.
• The reutllization rate of the material would have to be at least
30%, if not higher, to make the program pay for itself.
• Overhead and manpower costs would be higher under this
alternative.
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The creation of an excess Servmart would return a large amount
of material to the fleet. However, the benefits and costs are
difficult to measure and make this alternative less attractive.
ALTERNATIVE 4. Contract out for the operations of the less-
than-$20 excess material system:
Contracting out the low cost excess disposal system provides
several advantages to the Navy:
• The Navy would be out of the low cost excess disposal
business and would avoid all the costs associated with the
current excess disposal programs.
• Commercial contractors already supply the manpower for the
ISSOT teams and extending their control to administration of
the program shoiold not prove too difficult.
The disadvantages to this alternative are:
• Without a Request for Quotes or several fact-finding meetings,
it is difficult to predict what form of contract would best meet
the needs of the Navy and the contractors
• Without Navy control, the program miay not be very responsive
to needs of the fleet
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Until fimi contractor prices are available, the benefits of a
commercially run excess material system don't appear to be much
greater than the status quo.
ALTERNATIVE 5. Disposing of low dollar excess at sea:
Disposal at sea has several attractive features to it:
• It is an easy alternative to Implement.
• Processing costs are negligible.
• Significant cost savings can be incurred.
However, this alternative has several major problems associated
with it:
• It is environmentally irresponsible.
• The negative political ramifications are significant.
• There would be no reutQlzation of parts which still have some
value.
At-sea disposal may cause more problems than It will solve. The
negative environmental and political publicity that would
accompany such actions would not benefit the Navy. In the
upcoming era of restrictive budgets, the appearance of wasting
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parts would be detrimental to Navy funding requests. As a result,
this is the least attractive alternative.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the Navy evaluate the feaisibllity of
implementing the IMR program modifications presented in this
thesis to improve the cost effectiveness of the IMR program.
Addltlongdly, it is recommended that the segregation of less-than-
$20 material into separate carried and not carried boxes, as
practiced at NSC San Diego be eliminated. The separation of the
material serves no useful purpose and creates additional work.
•
Additional research is required into the areas of uncertainty
pointed out in this thesis. The primary research requirement is in
establishing both a contract t3rpe and approximate cost for
contracting out the low cost excess disposal functions.
Clarification of costs would allow a more accurate appraisal of the
commercial operation alternative. Determining a more accurate
cost to reprocure parts passed directly to DRMO would also allow
for a better comparative evaluation of sending parts directly to
DRMO and eliminating the IMR program. The following related
topics also require further investigation:
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• Initial Outfitting Models: Current outfitting models appear
to provide an excessive amount of spares, eventually leading
to large gimounts of excess material. Further reseairch Is
required to determine how to modify the models to provide the
requisite amount of support without generating an Inordinate
amount of surplus spares.
• COSAL and Load List maintenance onboard ships:
Additional research Is required to find out exactly how much
material Is taken off platforms that should really stay there.
There are Indications that some of the excess material on
ships may not In fact be excess.
• Type Commanders' mini-supply systems of repair parts:
An Investigation Into the payback mechanism for excess
material Is needed to understand a possible supply system
weakness. It appears that type commanders are hoarding
excess material from their overhauls. The supply system. If
functioning correctly, should Inhibit the formation of TYCOM
ready spares' pools.
• Other military excess material disposal systems: A
comparative investigation should be made Into the excess
material disposal system utilized by other services. A
comparison of the program costs and methodologies may prove
enlightening and lead to additional alternatives.
• Contract costs and holding costs: A streamlined process
would lower both contract costs and holding costs. Further
Investigation Into using some of the available technologies to
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TANSPORTATION 0.057 1 0.057 160.64 5600 2
PP 0.060 1 0.060
E-3 LBR E-4 LBR E-6 LBR ttTTS/DAY
LBOR 0.738 ! 0.738 100.48 128.64 103.04 450
TRUCK «LINE n BOXES/ [i PALLETS
COST PER BOX PALLET pr R TRUCK
SHIPPING 0.003 1 0.003 220 275 16 16
COST OF HOLDING
INV COST « PARTS il MONTHS










1 .985 1 1 .985
-..=--,
r.c COSTS
« PERS HOURS UAGE
hNDLING .006
! 0.006 5 4 .000 10.96
(lAT'L ($20)
VAL>$20 VAL<1i20 HOLD COST ;» PRTS
HLDING 0.295 0.295 54000 19653 0.23 4790
(lAT'L <$20 &
:;20 NOT RECVD BY S .D. )
ilBTOTAL 0.301 0.301
FX. COSTS 3.490 1 3.490 MTIS COST «PTS>'t20
( $20 KEPT AT NSC ) 3.49 766
3TAL WEIGHTED AVG .741 ! 0.741
r <$20 & >$20
SHIP COST** LINES/PAL
HIPPING 0.006 1 0.006 26.00 4400
DTAL 0.747 ! 0.747
3S0T COSTS PORTS [OAKLAND PORTS OAK PORTS OAKLAND
OVERHEAD OVLRHEAD
ONTRACT COSTS 1 .666 1 2.547 1 .32 2.28 0.26 0.117
DYS HLD DYS HLD HLD COST II 'V VALUE
DLDING 0.113 ; 0.264 45 105 0.23 19653
DTAL 1 .779 1 2.810
^ == = = = = = = = = = = =1=: = = =:;========
r^AND TOTAL 4 .504 ! 5.536
87





TRANS *t LINES ii TRIPS
TRANSPORTATION .033
i
0.033 160 .64 9600 2
ADP .060 ! 0.060
E-3 LBR E-4 LBR E-6 LBR il: TS/DAY
LABOR 0.738 1 0.738 100.48 128.64 103.04 450
TRUCK #LINE # BOXES/ n PALLETS
COST PER BOX PALLET P' ::R TRUCK
SHIPPING 0.003 1 0.003 220 275 16 16
COST OF HOLDING
INV COST *t PARTS n MONTHS
HOLDING 0.657 ; 0.657 109653 0.230 9600 3
TOTAL 1 .492 1.492
NSC COSTS
« PERS HOURS WAGE
HANDLING 0.006 1 0.006 5 4.000 10.96
(MAT'L <$20)
VAL>$20 VAL<$20 HOLD COST tt PRTS
HOLDING 0.170 1 0.170 54000 19653 0.23 8286
(MAT'L <$20 &
>$20 NOT RECVD BY S • D.)
SUBTOTAL 0.177 ! 0.177
REC . COSTS 3.490 1 3.490 MTIS COST «PTS>$20
( >$20 KEPT AT NSC
)
3 .49 1314
TOTAL WEIGHTED AVG 0.630 1 0.630
OF <$20 & >$20
SHIP COST# LINES/PAL
SHIPPING 0.006 ! 0.006 26.00 4400
TOTAL 0.636 1 0.636
ISSOT COSTS PORTS ; OAKLAND
.
PORTS OAK PORTS OAKLAND
OVERHEAD 0'.ERHEAD
CONTRACT COSTS 1 .666 1 2.547 1 .32 2.28 0.26 0.117
DYS HLD DYS HLD HLD COST ir JV VALUE
HOLDING 0.113 1 0.264 45 105 0.23 19653
TOTAL 1 .779 1 2.810
= = = = = = = = =: = = = = = = = =: = =::======== -'
'
GRAND TOTAL 3.900 1 4.932
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I s: B B nr a n X b
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IhO JA 7COO 2
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100.4 8 l?ft.64 103.04 4 SO
;h I PP I NG 0.002 0.002
TRUCK til INI H BOXES/ II PALLETS
COST (f I' (iOX PALLET C.R Tf<UC.K
220 400 16 16
iOLDirJG. 0.830 0.830
1 .672
COSf i>\ \\()\ \>]\\(.
IHV f.OSI II PARI', t; MUNTMS













VAI >t/0 VAL<t20 HOI n OO^T ll PPT'.
HOLDIf«IG 0.21'.
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;
. 2 1 •> .4000 196S J . .' i fj'.f.')
SUBTOTAL
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i .400 M! IS COST «PTft>'f>20
3.49 1040
TOTAL WEIGHTED AVG 0.669














1 .660 ^ . 04/
HOLDING 0.113 ./64
\'()\'\'. OAK POpro OH OAK OH
1 .32 2.28 0.26 0.11/
DYS HLD DYS HLD HLO COST INV VAI Ul
4 100 0.23 lor.o !
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3RAHU lOTAI 4 ,120 ISl
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OF <$20 & >$20
1 0.630
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FIGURE IX: CHANGE IN UNIT COST VERSUS
CHNG IN HOLDING TIME (15 DYS EACH SITE)
195 255 315
COST - PORTSMOUTH
375 435 495 555
NUMBER OF DAYS
675
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